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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
PAUL RUBEY and 
CAROL RUBEY, his wife, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
MORRIS T. WOOD and 
RUBY J. WOOD, his wife, 






Appeal from Judgment of Third District Court in 
and for Salt Lake County, Utah. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action in equity for specific perform-
ance of a written contract for the sale of land. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On April 18, 1959, appellants and repondents, 
at appellants' home near Herriman, Salt Lake Coun-
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ty, Utah, jointly prepared and executed a typewrit-
ten contract (Exhibit P-1) for the sale to respond-
ents of 728 acres, more or less, of farm land for a 
price of $107,000.00 with an option to purchase an 
additional 55 acres for $8,350.00. More than three 
weeks thereafter, on May 11, 1959, after several 
telephone conversations between the parties, the 
Rubeys and the Woods met again at the Wood home 
where they jointly prepared and executed a hand-
written supplement to the typewritten document 
(Exhibit P-2). The terms of this supplement re-
duced the amount of the initial payment, increased 
the amount of the annual installment payments, re-
peated various provisions of the typewritten contract 
and added certain provisions requested by appel-
lants. 
Subsequently, but before the initial payment 
was due, Rubey tendered $5,000.00 to Wood. Wood 
rejected the tender and repudiated the contract. This 
action was then commenced for specific perform-
ance. Appellants interposed a counterclaim seeking 
to quiet ti tie to the property, and for judgment de-
claring the contracts to be void. 
The action was tried on November 30 and De-
cember 1, 1960, before the Honorable Aldan J. An-
derson, sitting as a Court in Equity with an advisory 
jury. After plaintiffs put the two contracts into evi-
dence, defendants went forth first with their proof. 
At the conclusion of defendants' case, plaintiffs 
moved for and were granted a judgment for specific 
performance in the form of a Judgment on Directed 
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Verdict (R-9833, p.10). The Court stated that plain-
tiffs' contentions regarding the contracts were ac-
cepted and defendants' counterclaims were dis-
missed. From the judgment on directed verdict 
appellants appealed to the above entitled Court (Case 
No. 9447) in which appeal the above Court unani-
mously affirmed the lower court (R-9833, p. 14). 
Respondents then tendered to appellants $15,-
000.00 which tender was rejected in a letter signed 
by appellants stated as follows: 
"September 26, 1962 
"Dear Mr. and Mrs. Rubey: 
"We received a letter dated September 20, 
1962, from Jensen, Jensen & Bradford. 
"We particularly deny that there was ever 
a valid contract between us and further deny 
that any valid tender was ever made or a per-
formance made in any manner or form pro-
vided by law, or as promised as an inducement 
for said contracts, or as provided in said con-
tract or at all. 
"In particular, we deny that you ever 
made any payment or tender of payment called 
for on or before May 11, 1962, as you assert, 
and your present purported tender at this 
time is not timely and is refused. You are fur-
ther advised that your failure to pay pay-
ments has voided any claim or contract and 
you are further advised that any rights that 
you might claim under the purported con-
tracts have been terminated and are of no 
effect. 
''Very truly yours , 
jsj Morris T. Wood 
"jsj Ruby Wood" 
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Subsequent to the entry of the Decree of the 
lower court, from which the original Appeal in the 
above en ti tied cause was taken (Case No. 944 7) , and 
notwithstanding the fact that said Decree found the 
Agreement between the parties to be valid and bind-
ing, defendants placed on record in the office of the 
County Recorder of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
mortgages totaling $92,550.00. 
On the 4th day of October, 1962, respondents 
moved for an Order to Show Cause ( R-9833, p. 26). 
Appellants appeared and were found in contempt 
of court (R-10001, p. 106), but sentencing was 
stayed pending final outcome on appeal (R-10001, 
p. 114-5). 
Upon stipulation of all of the parties (R-10001, 
p. 114) a referee was appointed to interpret the 
contracts. By order of the court, (R-10001, p. 155), 
the report of the referee (R-10001, p. 121-6) was 
accepted by the court, the findings of the referee 
were adopted by the court, and the court made and 
entered Findings based upon the referee's report, 
together with addi tonal Findings of the court based 
upon its own study of the two contracts. An Amended 
Decree to this effect was entered July 29, 1963. No 
mention is made of this Amendment to Decree in 
either of appellants' Notices of Appeal (R-9833, p. 
55; R-10001, p. 167). 
On the 4th day of October, 1962, respondents 
commenced Civil Action No. 139046 in the Third 
Judicial District C~urt in and for Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, seeking damages for unlawful refusal 
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on the part of appellants to obey the Decree of the 
court and to deliver possession of portions of the 
property to respondents as said portions were paid 
in full by respondents, and seeking to remove the 
mortgages placed on said property by appellants 
after the entry of the original Decree December 1, 
1960. 
On or about the 15th of October, 1962, appel-
lants commenced Civil Action No. 139263 in the low-
er court seeking a declaratory judgment that the 
contracts between the parties were void by reason 
of alleged breach on the part of respondents. On 
October 23, 1962, appellants' Motion to consolidate 
No. 139263 with No. 124832 was granted, where-
upon respondents' Motion to Dismiss No. 139263 
was also granted ( R-9833, p. 43-44). No appeal was 
taken from said Decree. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE COURT PROPERLY INTERPRETED 
THE TWO WRITTEN CONTRACTS ACCORD-
ING TO THEIR TERMS. 
POINT II 
APPELLANTS' SECOND POINT IS WITH-
OUT MERIT FOR THE REASON THAT NO MO-
TION TO DISMISS WAS MADE BY APPEL-
LANTS BELOW, AND FOR THE FURTHER 
REASON THAT RESPONDENTS MADE TIME-
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LY ANNUAL INSTALLMENT PAYMENTS UN-
DER THE CONTRACTS. 
POINT III 
THE INTERPRETATION OF THE CON-
TRACTS WAS A MATTER OF LAW TO BE 
DETERMINED BY THE COURT FROM THE 
FACE OF THE INSTRUMENTS AND NO FUR-
THER TESTIMONY WAS REQUIRED BY THE 
COURT. . 
POINT IV 
THE .LOWER COURT PROPERLY INTER-
p R E T E D THE WORDS "OR MORE" CON-
TAINED IN THE CONTRACTS. 
POINT V 
APPELLANTS HAD NO RIGHT TO A JURY 
TRIAL BELOW FOR THE REASON THAT THE 
INSTANT CASE IS ONE IN EQUITY AND THE 
MATTERS DETERMINED BY THE LOWER 
C 0 U R T FROM WHICH THESE APPEALS 
WERE TAKEN WERE MATTERS OF LAW. 
POINT VI 
THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY DETER-
MINED THAT APPELLANTS WE~E' NOT EN-
TITLED TO INTEREST UNDER THE CON-
TRACTS. 
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POINT VII 
THE COURT PROPERLY CONSOLIDATED 
CIVIL ACTION NO. 139263 WITH NO. 124832 
AND PROPERLY DISMISSED NO. 139263. 
POINT VIII 
THE LOWER COURT P R 0 P E R L Y DI-
RECTED THE CLERK OF THE COURT TO 
MAKE AND DELIVER A WARRANTY DEED 
TO THE RESPONDENTS SUBSEQUENT TO 
APPELLANTS' REFUSAL TO OBEY THE OR-
DER OF THE COURT TO EXECUTE SUCH 
DEED. 
POINT IX 
IT WAS PROPER FOR THE LOWER COURT 
TO ORDER THE CLERK OF THE COURT TO 
SATISFY A JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF PLAIN-
TIFFS-RESPONDENTS F 0 R ATTORNEY'S 
FEES AND COSTS OF SUIT OUT OF THE DE-
POSIT THAT HAD BEEN MADE TO THE 
CLERK OF THE COURT BY RESPONDENTS. 
POINT X 
THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY A WARD-
ED JUDGMENT FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES IN 
FAVOR OF RESPONDENTS BASED UPON THE 
TESTIMONY OF COUNSEL FOR RESPOND-
ENTS. 
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POINT XI 
THE APPELLATE COURT SHOULD NOT 
GIVE CONSIDERATION TO APPELLANTS' 
BRIEF FOR THE REASON THAT IT STATES 
ONLY POINTS OF LAW AND MAKES NO REF-
ERENCE TO ANY FACTS IN THE RECORD 
TO WHICH SUCH POINTS OF LAW MAY BE 
RELEVANT. 
POINT XII 
APPEAL NO. 10001 SHOULD BE DIS-
MISSED BECAUSE THE ORDER ENTERED 
SEPTEMBER 26, 1963 FROM WHICH THE AP-
PEAL IS TAKEN IS NOT A FINAL JUDGMENT. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT PROPERLY INTERPRETED 
THE TWO WRITTEN CONTRACTS ACCORD-
ING TO THEIR TERMS. 
Appellants have referred this Court to the 
briefs submitted in the first appeal in the above en-
titled matter, and consequently respondents are 
forced to make reference to said briefs, as back-
ground, although such reference to the closed chap-
ters of the long and painful history of this case is 
merely offered by appellants to assist them in their 
newest of many repeated attempts to obtain a re-
view and re-adjudication of matters long since 
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settled. This Court, however, should not consider 
appellants' repetitious challenges to the decisions 
of this Court and the court below in the case at bar, 
which decisions do not coincide with appellants' 
views, as being either reason or argument. "While 
it may be a relief to their feelings, it does not carry 
conviction to the judicial mind." Hilton v. Thatcher, 
31 U. 360, at p. 377, 88 P. 20 (1907). 
The issues before this Court on the first appeal 
of the case had generally to do with whether the two 
contracts involved were valid and binding or wheth-
er, as contended by appellants, they should have been 
rescinded for fraud. Those issues were resolved in 
favor of respondents when this Honorable Court 
unanimously affirmed the lower court ( R-9833, p. 
14). 
The general issue before the lower court since 
the conclusion of the first appeal, and the issue now 
before this Court is: How are the contracts to be 
performed? 
Appellants' Point 1 rests on the assumption that 
the two documents involved herein were prepared 
solely by respondents. This assumption is false. The 
typewritten document prepared April 18, 1959, was 
fully discussed point by point in the presence of all 
parties thereto, and was then dictated aloud in the 
presence of all parties by Paul Rubey to his wife, 
who operated the typewriter. The handwritten docu-
ment dated May 11, 1959, was dictated by appellant 
Morris Wood to respondent Paul Rubey in the pres-
ence of all parties to said document. These facts are 
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born out by the following references to the transcript 
of trial: P. 46, lines 3-6; P. 42, lines 9-12; P. 79, 
lines 7-14; P. 80, line 30; P. 81, lines 9-11; P. 81, 
lines 17-25; P. 88, lines 17-22; P. 100, lines 7-10; P. 
115, lines 15-22. 
Appellants refer on page 7 of their brief to 12 
Am. Jur. 795, Sec. 252, concerning the manner in 
which doubtful language in contracts should be in-
terpreted most strongly against the party who uses 
it. However, no language is cited in appellants' brief 
from either contract which appellants claim to be 
doubtful. This portion of appellants' brief should 
therefore not be considered by the Court. See re-
spondents' Point XI below. The rule quoted by ap-
pellants is further explained in Sec. 252 of 12 Am. 
Jur. Contracts, pp. 795-796 as follows: 
"The rule that expressions will be inter-
preted against the person using them applies 
only where, after the ordinary rules of inter-
pretation have been applied, the agreement 
is still ambiguous." 
In 17 A CJS, p. 28 is stated: 
"So a contract is ambiguous when, and 
only when, it is, or the provisions in contro-
versy are, reasonably or fairly susceptible 
of different constructions or interpreta-
tions. . . . " ( p. 34) 
Neither the trial court below, nor the referee 
appointed pursuant to stipulation, found the lan-
guage in either contract to be susceptible to differ-
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ent constructions or meanings. Consequently, rules 
of construction do not apply. 
Furthermore, when a contract is prepared by 
both parties, using the language of both, one being 
merely a scrivener, there is no reason to construe 
the contract against anyone. Although Mrs. Rubey 
typed the first contract and Mr. Rubey wrote the 
second, both documents were, in fact, the product of 
the minds of all of the parties thereto. Appellants 
complain that the lower court ruled in favor of re-
spondents in every instance. This fact is not dis-
puted, but it is respectfully asserted that the con-
tracts were thus interpreted because respondents' 
contentions were the only logical interpretation pos-
sible. 
Stout V13. Washington Fire and Marine Insur-
ance Co., 14 U. 2d 414, 385 P. 2d 608 (1963), quoted 
in appellants' brief, is not in point for the reason 
that it involved an insurance policy which in fact 
contained doubts and uncertainties as to its mean-
ing and effect and was therefore properly construed 
most strongly against the insurance company which 
prepared it. To the contrary, in the case at bar, the 
typewritten contract between Rubey and Wood was 
prepared by both of them, and the handwritten con-
tract was written by Rubey upon the dictation of 
Wood. The facts in the instant case are therefore 
distinguishable from the facts in the Stout case. 
This Court, in its original opinion rendered in 
the above entitled cause stated: 
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"The parties were strangers to each 
other. There had been no previous contacts 
and no reason to establish a trusting relation-
ship." (R-9833, p. 14.) 
The parties to the two documents now in question 
stood on equal footing, were free to do what they 
chose, and because there is no Utah statute to the 
contrary, the only duty of the lower court was to 
discover the meaning of the specific documents and 
to enforce them without leaning in either direction. 
12 Am. Jur. Contracts, Sec. 226 et seq p. 7 45. 
At page 8 of their brief, appellants again allege 
that Rubey had extraordinary background and ex-
perience and infer that the Woods were naive and 
inexperienced. On this point, reference is again made 
to the Court's previous opinion in the above entitled 
matter (R-9833, p. 14) where the Court quoted Jus-
tice Crockett in Lewis v. White 2 U. 2d 101, 269 P. 
2d 865 ( 1954) as follows: 
"No matter how naive or inexperienced 
the defendants were, they could not close their 
eyes and accept unquestioningly any repre-
sentations made to them. It was their duty to 
make such investigation and inquiry as reas-
onable care under the circumstances would 
dictate." 
Any naivete or inexperience under which appel-
lants may have labored at the conception of the two 
documents before the court is no defense to an ac-
tion for specific performance, nor should it now be 
pertinent upon the question of interpretation of the 
contracts. 
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There being no reason to construe either of the 
contracts against any party thereto, the court below 
properly interpreted the contracts according to their 
terms. 
POINT II 
APPELLANTS' SECOND POINT IS WITH-
OUT MERIT FOR THE REASON THAT NO MO-
TION TO DISMISS WAS MADE BY APPEL-
LANTS BELOW, AND FOR THE FURTHER 
REASON THAT RESPONDENTS MADE TIME-
LY ANNUAL INSTALLMENT PAYMENTS UN-
DER THE CONTRACTS. 
Appellants' Notice of Appeal in Case No. 9833 
( R-9833, p. 55) makes no reference to a Motion to 
Dismiss, nor does their Notice of Appeal in Case No. 
10001 (R-10001, p. 167). There is in fact no such 
motion in the record. There is therefore nothing for 
the Court to consider under Point 2 of appellants' 
Brief. 
Appellants have repeatedly sought to obtain a 
redetermination of the merits of this case with their 
successive motions, objections etc. in the lower 
court, their action commenced for Declaratory J udg-
ment, their motion in the above court to rehear the 
original appeal and their Motion to Recall Remit-
titur and Reconsider their Motion for Rehearing in 
the above Court on the initial appeal. Again, in Point 
2 of their brief, appellants attempt to avoid the con-
sequences of the original judgment for specific per-
formance, as unanimously affirmed by this Court, 
by making reference to a nonexistent motion to dis-
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miss based on an alleged failure to tender contract 
payments as required by the contracts within the 
time specified, or within the 90-day grace period 
therein set forth. 
In any event, respondents have repeatedly made 
timely tender of the annual contract installment pay-
ments called for in the agreement. 
The record reflects that early in 1960, before 
the first payment was due on the contract, respond-
ents tendered to appellants $5,000.00 representing 
the initial payment on the contract ( Tr. p. 49). This 
payment was refused, the contract was repudiated 
and this action resulted. Thereafter, on the 7th day 
of December, 1960, respondents tendered to appel-
lants $10,730.00 representing the initial payment to-
gether with the annual installment payment for the 
year 1961 (R-10001, p. 59), which installment was 
then not yet due. This tender was likewise refused. 
Thereafter, on the 20th day of September, 1962, be-
for the third annual installment payment was due, 
respondents tendered to appellants $15,000.00 (R-
10001, p. 97) representing the payments for 1960, 
1961 and 1962. Again this tender was rejected. 
(See appellants' letter set forth in the statement 
of facts above.) 
In the Conclusions of Law entered by the lower 
Court on the 27th day of November 1962, (R-9833 p. 
38) the court stated that the tender of $15,000.00 
by letter and the payment into court in Civil Action 
No. 139046 was a valid and timely tender of the 
$15,000.00. The sum of $15,000.00 was thereafter 
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paid into Court by respondents in Civil Action No. 
139046 and said sum minus certain costs paid there-
from pursuant to Court Order ( R-9833, p. 43-5), 
remains on deposit with the court. 
The transcript of trial discloses the following: 
P. 25, lines 2-5 
"Q. You were aware, were you not, that 
this last spring, in 1960, Mr. Rubey through 
his attorney, Mr. Jensen, offered to pay it to 
me as your attorney, a $5,000.00 payment? 
"A. Yes." 
P. 50, lines 20-25 
"Q. I would like to clear up the time 
when this $5,000.00 was offered. I was just 
about to look to see when this action was filed. 
Depositions were taken on April16, 1960 and 
the action was filed before that. Wasn't it 
true that the $5,000.00 offer was made before 
this suit was commenced? 
"A. Yes." 
It thus appears clearly from the facts that each 
year respondents have made timely tender of full, 
cumulative payment to appellants. Appellants' state-
ment in Point 2 on page 8 of their brief, is therefore 
not true. Even if such tender had not been made, re-
spondents would have been excused therefrom under 
the general rule that tender to a party who has 
breached a contract or repudiated it is a futile act 
and is not required. 
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In 17 A CJS, p. 680, is stated: 
"Non tender of performance is excused 
where it is apparent that a tender would be 
a vain and idle ceremony, or where the other 
party has prevented performance." 
From the inception of the above cause, appel-
lants have steadfastly repudiated the contracts, 
which repudiation must certainly deprive appellants 
of any right to claim a breach on the part of respond-
ents, even had the same occurred. 
The rule stated above excused respondents from 
tendering the annual installment payments, but re-
spondents have nevertheless gone the extra mile and 
made repeated tenders notwithstanding appellants' 
repudiation of the contracts. 
Appellants in their brief cite Shernwn w. West-
ern Construct-ion Company, Inc., 14 Wash. 2d 252, 
127 P.2d, 673 ( 1942), 17 CJS 932, but the language 
quoted by appellants appears in the dissent, not in 
the main opinion. Thus, that case does not stand 
for the proposition claimed by appellants, and is not 
in point. 
Appellants further quote from the last phrase 
of 55 Am. Jur. p. 1014 under Vendor and Purchase, 
Section 621, where it states: 
" ... and if payment is to be made in in-
stallments, default in the payment of any in-
stallment is 3: distinct breach and gives tlie 
vendor the right to declare the forfeiture 
therefor." 
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However, appellants omitted the first part of 
this paragraph which states: 
"The equitable estate or interest of the 
purchaser under an executory contract for the 
sale of land may be subject to be defeated 
under provisions therefor in the contract if 
he fails to comply with the stipulations in the 
contract." 55 Am. Jur., p. 1014, Sec. 621 (Ital-
ics ours). 
Obviously, the passage quoted by appellants is 
a misleading extraction from the context of the para-
graph and is improper in appellants' brief. Forfeit-
ure for nonpayment is only a remedy if such remedy 
is explicitely spelled out in the contract. The Rubey-
Wood contract contains no such remedy of forfeit-
ure for non-payment. True, the handwritten docu-
ment (Exhibit P-2) provides for liquidated dam-
ages in the event of default, but the typewritten 
document (Exhibit P-1) expressly binds the buyers 
to buy the entire 728 acres, and there is no express 
remedy for forfeiture in case of non-payment. Fur-
thermore, there is no fact of non-payment in the in-
stant case as set forth above. 
Appellants have continuously, throughout the 
long history of the above case, appeared to assume 
that the breach of contract, assuming the same were 
to occur, would, in and of itself, automatically void 
the con tract. Con tracts, however, do not terminate 
automatically. A default under a contract may be 
waived. Cancellation requires affirmative action by 
the party desiring to terminate a contract and there 
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is no such action on the part of the Woods in the 
above cause except an abortive attempt to obtain 
a Declaratory Judgment, which action was properly 
dismissed (R-9833, p. 43-4). 
Even if a Motion to Dismiss had been filed by 
appellants based on an alleged non-tender under the 
contract, such motion would have been properly 
denied. 
POINT III 
THE INTERPRETATION OF THE CON-
TRACTS WAS A MATTER OF LAW TO BE DE-
TERMINED BY THE COURT FROM THE FACE 
OF THE INSTRUMENTS AND NO FURTHER 
TESTIMONY WAS REQUIRED BY THE COURT. 
A. The intention of parties to a contract must 
be determined by the Court from an examination 
of the contract only. 12 Am. Jur. Contracts, Sec. 229. 
Throughout the long history of the proceedings 
in the above entitled cause, defendant-appellants 
have continually urged the court to take evidence 
to determine the intention of the parties at the times 
the two documents were executed in an effort to get 
the court to interpret the contracts in accordance 
with appellants' contentions. The general rule con-
cerning interpretation of contracts is set forth in 12 
Am. Jur. Contracts, 227, p. 746 as follows: 
"Whatever may be the inaccuracy of ex-
pression or of the ineptness of the words used 
in an instrument in a legal view, if the inten-
tion of the parties can be clearly discovered, 
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the Court will give effect to it and construe 
the words accordingly. It must not be sup-
posed, however, that an attempt is made to 
ascertain the actual mental processes of the 
. parties to a particular contract. The law pre-
sumes that the parties understood the import 
of their contract and that they have the inten-
tion which its terms manifest. It is not within 
the function of the judiciary to look outside 
of the instrument to get at the intention of 
the parties and then carry out that intention 
regardless of whether the instrument contains 
language sufficient to express it; but their 
sole duty is to find out what was meant by 
the language of the instrument .... Taking 
into consideration this limitation, it may be 
said that the object of all rules of interpreta-
tion is to arrive at the intention of the parties 
as it is expressed in the contract. In other 
words, the object to be attained in interpret-
ing a con tract is to ascertain the meaning and 
intent of the parties as expressed in the lan-
guage used.'' · 
Under this general rule, it would have been im-
proper for the lower court in this matter to have in-
quired into the subjective intent of the parties to the 
contracts as it may have existed prior to and at the 
time of the execution of the two contracts in this 
case. The court was limited to a consideration of 
the intention of the parties as it appeared from the 
language used by the parties in the two documents 
themselves. 
There is a myriad of cases standing for the 
proposition that the intention of an instrument may 
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be determined only from an examination of the terms 
of the instrument itself. See Cook vs. Smith, 107 Tex. 
119, 174 S.W. 1094,3 A.L.R. 940 (1915); Coal River 
Collieries vs. Eureka Coal and Wood Co., 144 Va. 
263, 132 S.E. 337, 46 A.L.R. 485 (1926); Kleuter 
vs. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 143 Wis. 347, 128' 
N.W. 43 (1910); Conery vs. New Orleans Water 
WorloJ Co., 142, U.S. 79, 35 L. Ed. 943, 12 S. ct. 142 
(1891); Griffin vs. Fairmont Coal Co., 59 W. Va. 
480, 53 S.E. 24 ( 1905) ; Schneider vs. Turner, 130 
Ill., 28, 22 N.E. 497 (1889); Delaware Ins. Co. vs. 
Greer, 120 F. 916 (1903). 
These rules may be summarized as follows: 
It is commonly said that where a contract is 
plain and unambiguous, its meaning should be de-
termined without reference to extraneous facts; sim-
ilarly it is said that where there is no ambiguity in 
the language used in the contract, the intention of 
the parties must be gathered from that and from 
that alone. 12 Am. Jur. Contracts, Sec. 229, p. 752; 
Green vs. Biddle, 8 Wheat. (U.S.) 1, 5 L. Ed. 547; 
Kihlberg vs. U.S. 97 U.S. 398, 24 L. Ed 1106 (1878). 
The lower Court referred the two contracts to 
a referee pursuant to a stipulation of all of the 
parties (R-10001, p. 114). The referee found the 
document to be understandable and enforceable ac-
cording to its own terms and made specific findings 
with respect to the following: 
1. The two contracts are one final agreement. 
2. The contracts are performable. 
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3. The real estate described therein is suffi-
ciently identified. 
4. The purchase price is clear. 
5. The initial payment of $5,000.00 was to be" 
made one year from May 11, 1959 with a 90-day 
grace period. 
6. The time for payment of the subsequent an-
nual installments was within the calendar year plus 
the 90-day grace period. 
7. The contract provides for no interest but 
provides that sellers retain crops in lieu of interest. 
No interest could be charged beyond that. 
8. The release clause is clear. 
9. Sellers have the duty of furnishing sur-
veys. 
10. Sellers are obligated to deliver a separate 
warranty deed on each parcel as conveyed. 
11. The written notice requirement is clear. 
12. Taxes are to be paid by sellers on unre-
leased parcels. 
13. There is an option to purchase 55 addition-
al acres. 
The referee suggested that the Court make ad-
ditional findings as to the following matters: 
1. Title insurance. 
2. Surveys. 
3. The phrase "the release clause would not 
release the buyers from the said amount of 728 
acres." 
4. Reduction of the purchase price in the event 
certain parcels were not in fact owned by the sellers. 
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Even though the contracts involved in this case 
leave something to be desired as far as the artfull-
ness of the language in them is concerned, still the 
language was clear and unambiguous as found by 
the referee and the court. There was, therefore, no 
reason for the court to admit extrinsic evidence to 
assist the court or the referee in interpreting the 
terms of the contracts. 
There is still another reason why the lower court 
could not admit extrinsic evidence d'hors the con-
tracts.as urged by appellants. In 12 Am. Jur. Con-
tracts, 232 at p. 755 is stated: 
"Where the parties intend a writing to 
be the sole memorial or integration of the con-
tract, the writing embodies the contract and, 
accordingly, the interpretation of the contract 
consists of interpretation of the writing. A 
solemn instrument embodying the final inten-
tions and agreements of the parties must be 
interpreted according to the· legal import of 
its terms. In the absence of mistake or fraud, 
a written contract merges all prior and con-
temporaneous negotiations in reference to the 
same subject, and the whole engagement of 
the parties and the extent and manner of their 
undertaking are embraced in the writing. The 
written agreement and not the correspondence 
which preceded it is the correct exponent of 
the contract. All verbal agreements made at 
or before the time of the execution of a con-
tract, are to be considered as merged in the 
written intsrument." 
If, in each .case of dispute over a contract, the 
Court were to inquire in to the relations of the 
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parties, their knowledge, their discussions and ver-
bal negotiations, there would be no point in prepar-
ing a written contract. The writing is the final word. 
The contracts in the instant case must there-
fore be considered to be the final integration and 
the sole memorial of the agreement between the 
Rubeys and the Woods. Absence of mistake or fraud 
was specifically found by the court on the trial be-
low as affirmed by the Supreme Court on the first 
appeal. Consequently, the written documents merged 
in all prior and contemporaneous negotiations with 
respect to the sale of the real estate involved in the 
contracts, and therefore these written contracts, and 
not the correspondence or discussions which pre-
ceeded them are the correct exponents of the con-
tracts between the Rubeys and the Woods. The court 
therefore could not properly have looked outside the 
two documents to extrinsic evidence for the purpose 
of determining the intention of the parties as urged 
by appellants. 
That a court may refer matters to a referee 
is clearly set forth in Rule 53(a) and (b) Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. By stipulation of the par-
ties hereto ( R-1 0001, p. 114) , the lower court in 
the instant case referred the contracts by consent to 
a referee, and based upon the report of the referee, 
the court applied its judicial function in interpret-
ing the con tracts and applying the law thereto. 
As far as the findings of the referee are. con-
cerned on appeal Hannaman m Karrick, 9 U. 236, 
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33 P. 1039 (1893); Hannaman vs. Karrick, 168 U.S. 
328, 42 L. Ed. 484, 18 S.Ct. 135 ( 1897) states that 
the findings of the referee which have been adopted 
by the Court will not be disturbed unless it is clearly 
manifest that there was error or oversight. Appel-
lants have shown no oversight or error in the ref-
eree's findings, and this Court, therefore, should not 
disturb them. 
On page 10 of their brief, appellants refer to 
55 Am. Jur. Vendor and Purchaser, Sections 97 and 
98, p. 573 as though the lower court had a duty to 
interpret the contracts. However, the first footnote 
under Section 97 refers to 12 Am. Jur. Contracts, 
Sec. 227, p. 746 referred to above (p. 18). Thus 
the applicability of the rules of construction referred 
to under the title Vendor and Purchaser in 55 Am. 
Jur. Sec. 97-98 depends initially on whether the con-
tract in question need interpreting or whether the 
contract is sufficiently clear as to speak for itself. 
As pointed out above, these rules of construction do 
not apply here. 
In Newcomb vs. Wood, 97 U.S. 581, 24 L. Ed. 
1085 (1878) is stated that parties who have stipu-
lated that a controversy be submitted to a referee 
clearly imply that they intend the award or report 
to be final and conclusive. Thus, when the parties 
in the instant case stipulated that the contracts be 
submitted to a referee, they impliedly expressed their 
intent that the referee's report would be binaing and 
conclusive, and appellants should not be permitted 
to complain of said findings. 
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B. Following the remittitur from the Supreme 
Court on the first appeal, no questions of fact were 
before the court, the sole issue being the interpreta-
tion ,of the written documents already held to be 
valid, binding and subsisting contracts in the orig-
inal trial and on the first appeal. 
Appellants cite no "disputed questions of fact" 
in their brief under their point 3 (b) and that point 
should therefore be disregarded by the Court. 
C. The referee in paragraph 7 of his report, 
(R-10001, p. 121) specifically found that each an-
nual installment was to be paid within each calen-
dar year plus a 90-day grace period. This finding 
was expressly incorporated into the findings of the 
court (R-10001, p. 155-60). 
The determination of the time when each an-
nual installment was to be paid was a matter of law, 
which was determined by the referee and the court, 
and, as such, is not the proper basis for appeal. 
D. The referee made no specific findings con-
cerning title insurance and surveys, but the court, 
upon an examination of the documents, made find-
ings concerning these matters (R-10001, p. 155-60). 
The fact that the court was able, from the docu-
ments themselves, to make specific findings concern-
ing the matters left unresolved by the referee, is in 
and of itself sufficient proof that the documents 
were, on their face, clear, unambiguous and suscept-
ible of proper interpretation by the court as a mat-
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ter of law and without resorting to extrinsic evi-
dence. 
POINT IV 
THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY INTER-
PRETED THE WORDS "OR MORE" CONTAIN-
ED IN THE CONTRACTS. 
In the lower court, appellants contended that 
the words "or more" appearing in the contracts in 
question, meant that the contract sellers, i.e., appel-
lants, were to have the right to make demand upon 
the buyers (respondents) to make payments in ex-
cess of the amounts called for in the contracts. The 
referee determined that the words "or more" under 
general usage in the real estate industry, and accord-
ing to the law of contracts in general, gave the buy-
ers, not the sellers, the option to accelerate contract 
payments. The usual interpretation of those words 
is clear, and the court cannot be said to have com-
mitted an error by failing to admit parole evidence 
to vary their obvious and universal meaning. 
The general rule is stated in 12 Arn. Jur., Con-
tracts, Sec. 236, p. 758 as follows: 
"Words will be given their ordinary 
meaning when nothing appears to show that 
they are used in a different sense, and no 
unreasonable or absurd consequences will re-
sult from doing so. Words chosen by the con-
tracting parties should not be unnaturally 
forced beyond their ordinary meaning or giv-
en a curious, hidden sense which nothing but 
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the exigency of a hard case and the ingenuity 
of a trained and acute mind can discover." 
The words "or more" have an ordinary mean-
ing as found by the referee and the lower court. 
There is no reason appearing in the contracts or the 
record to force these words unnaturally beyond their 
ordinary meaning. Nothing appears in the contract 
as supplemented to suggest that any other meaning 
was intended than the usual and ordinary meaning 
of the words. It is ridiculous to construe "or more" 
to give the seller the right to demand more than is 
due. Such construction would make the instrument 
a demand instrument, whereas the contracts in ques-
tion, in fact, provide for annual installment pay-
ments over a period up to 23 years. 
For these reasons, and because no proffer of 
evidence to the contrary was made by appellants be-
low, there was no reason for the lower court to 
admit such evidence and failure to do so cannot be 
said to have been error. 
POINT V 
APPELLANTS HAD NO RIGHT TO A JURY 
TRIAL BELOW FOR THE REASON THAT THE 
INSTANT CASE IS ONE IN EQUITY AND THE 
MATTERS DETERMINED BY THE LOWER 
COURT FROM WHICH THESE APPEALS 
WERE TAKEN WERE MATTERS OF LAW. 
The answer to Point 5 contained in appellants' 
brief appears in appellants' own discussion, where it 
is stated that: 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
28 
"The Constitution of the United States, 
the Utah State Constitution and our Rules 
of Civil Procedure all direct that a jury trial 
shall be had upon demand of any party, unlesl3 
it is an equity proceeding or some other situa-
tion where a jury trial is not appropriate." 
(Italics our) (Appellants' Brief p. 13.) 
The above Court in its original opinion in the 
case at bar stated that this case is one in equity. The 
general rule is that equitable actions, as such, are 
not within the constitutional provisions that . the 
right to trial by jury shall remain inviolate so that 
the right as "heretofore enjoyed" shall be preserved. 
Ketchum Coal Co. vs. District Court of Carbon Coun-
ty, 48 U. 342, 159, p. 737 ( 1916) ; U. S. vs. Loufu-
iana, 339 U.S. 699 94 L. Ed 1216, 70 S.Ct. 914 
(1950); Pacific Railway Company vs. Wade, 91 Cal. 
449, 27 P 768 (1891); Woolsey vs. Woolsey, 121 
Cal. App. 576, 9 P. 2d 605 ( 1932) ; U. S. Fidelity & 
Guarantee Company vs. Springbrook Farm Dairy, 
Inc., 135 Conn. 294, 64 A 2d. 39, 13 A.L.R. 2d 769 
(1949). 
Thus, the constitutional guarantees to a jury 
trial as are claimed by appellants were not available 
to them in this equity case. 
This action is one for specific performance of 
written documents, the meaning and operation of 
which have been in issue since the Supreme Court 
affirmed the lower court to the effect that the doc-
uments were one binding agreement. 
The legal effect of written instruments is a 
question of law to be determined by the Court, even 
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where the facts affecting the terms of the written 
instrument are in dispute as where the instruments 
have been lost, in which case the jury may find what 
the terms of the contract were. Verdi vs. Helper 
State Bank, 57 U. 502, p. 510, 196 P. 225 (1921). 
In Title 78-21-3 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
it is stated that the Court is to decide questions of 
law, including the construction of statutes and other 
writings. It was thus for the Court below, not a jury, 
to interpret the contracts in evidence. 
Appellants cite Holland vs. Wilson, 8 U. 2d 11, 
327 P. 2d 250 (1958) which case is not in point. 
That action was one to quiet title, an action at law, 
not one in equity for the construction or interpreta-
tion of written documents as is the instant case. 
True, appellants herein originally interposed a coun-
terclaim to quiet title, but that did not convert the 
action to one at law. In Butler Bros. Development 
Company vs. Butler, 111 Vt. 329, 108 P. 2d 1041 
( 1941), it was held that imposing a legal defense 
to an equitable action does not as a general rule 
entitle a party to a jury trial. (Accord: Holland vs. 
Wifuon, supra; Newbern vs. Farris, 149 Okl. 74, 299, 
P. 192 (1931).) Appellants, by their counterclaim 
to quiet title, did not become entitled to a jury trial. 
Furthermore, the lower court, prior to the first ap-
peal, expressly dismissed all of the appellants' coun-
terclaims ( R-9833, p. 12) so that subsequently there 
was no issue to quiet title before the court. 
Even if appellants below had been entitled to 
a jury trial they waived such right by failing to de-
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mand a jury trial. The general rule is that a failure 
to demand a jury trial or properly to give notice that 
one is desired within the time provided by statute 
constitutes or gives rise to a presumption that that 
right has been waived. Rule 38 U.R.C.P; Duignan 
VIS. u. s., 27 4 u. s. 195, 71 L. Ed. 996, 4 7 s. Ct. 566 
(1927); Gulbenkian vs. Gulbenkian, 147 F. 2d 173 
(1945). 
Several documents appear in the record in which 
appellants generally allude to their claim that the 
court should take additonal testimony and evi-
dence to bring out the intentions of the parties, but 
nowhere does there appear a demand for a jury sub-
sequent to the first appeal. See Morris Wood's affi-
davit (R-10001, p. 88); appellants' Motion to stay 
enforcement of judgment (R-10001, p. 86); affi-
davit of counsel for appellants (R-10001, p. 107); 
stipulation (R-10001, p. 107); stipulation (R-10001, 
p. 114); Objections to Amendment to Decree (R-
10001, p. 153) ; Objections to Amendment of Decree 
(R-10001, p. 161); affidavit (R-9833, p. 34). Ap-
pellants' failure to demand a jury below, or give 
notice that one was desired was a waiver of any 
right they may have claimed to a jury trial and not 
having raised the question of a right to a trial by 
jury below, appellants may not raise such an issue 
for the first time on appeal. 
A jury trial may be demanded only when issues 
of fact arise from the pleadings, 59 C.J.S. p. 739, 
fts. 99, 2 and 3. No such issues of fact have been 
before the lower court since the conclusion of the 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
31 
first appeal herein, and consequently, appellants 
have had no right to a jury. 
POINT VI 
THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY DETER-
MINED THAT APPELLANTS WERE NOT EN-
TITLED TO INTEREST UNDER THE CON-
TRACTS. 
The contracts before the Court provide that 
the sellers, appellants herein, were to retain all crops 
on property not fully paid for and released to the 
buyers, respondents. The referee specifically found 
that such provision was in lieu of interest that no 
interest could be charged beyond that (R-10001, p. 
123, para. 8). This finding of the referee was specif-
ically incorporated in the findings of the court. ( R-
10001, p. 157, para. g). 
This interpretation is substantiated in the orig-
inal opinion of the above-entitled Court (R-9833, 
p. 14) where it is stated: 
"Defendants testified that they did not 
read the contract but understood from the oral 
representation of plaintiff that: ... (2) they 
were to have full use of all the land until fully 
paid for in lieu of the payment of interest ... " 
Interest is payable on a contract only when a 
contract so provides. It is untenable to suppose that 
respondents should be required to allow appellants 
to retain possession of the land and the crops, and 
in addition, be required to pay interest on the un-
paid contract balance. 
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The authority cited under Point 6 of appellants' 
brief, Wasatch Mining Company vs. Cresent Mining 
Co., 7 U. 8, 24 P. 586 (1890) sets forth the general 
rule in Utah that interest may be allowed on debts 
overdue, even in the absence of a statute or a con-
tract providing therefor. Respondents do not quar-
rel with this citation of the Utah Law, but point 
out to the Court that the Wasatch case is inapplicable 
to the case at bar for the reason that there is no 
overdue debt involved upon which the court could 
have allowed interest to accrue. Obviously, the un-
paid contract balance is not due except as and when 
the annual $5,000.00 installment payments fall due 
on December 31 of each calendar year (R-10001, p. 
156, para. f). As stated in Point II above, however, 
respondents have repeatedly made timely tender to 
appellants so that at no time has there been any 
amount of the purchase price provided in said con-
tract which could be said to be past due, and as to 
which interest could accrue. 
The following extracts from the transcript of 
trial further demonstrate the agreement between 
the parties that appellants were to retain crops in 
lieu of interest: 
Page 63, lines 19-22: 
"A. Mr. Wood did say, 'I didn't have you 
any interest.' Mr. Rubey says, 'Inasmuch as 
you are farming the ground, well, I didn't fig-
ure I should pay any interest.' And Mr. Wood 
said that was all right." 
Page 15, lines 17-24: 
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"Q. Did you have a discussion with re-
gard to interest?" 
"A. He didn't want to pay interest. I 
thought inasmuch as I was cropping the land 
it would be all right." 
"Q. Because you would have the use and 
he wouldn't be required to pay interest on the 
unpaid balance?" 
"A. Yes." 
"Q. Is that what was said between you?" 
"A. Yes." 
Page 19, lines 2-4 : 
"Q. Did you discuss the interest angle?" 
"A. I left the interest out inasmuch as 
I was keeping the farm to crop. I thought that 
would be all right." 
The lower court, in considering the contracts 
before it, properly observed that prior to full pay-
ment for any portion of the land, crops were to be 
retained by appellants, and as to said land, the por-
tion of the purchase price pertaining thereto, could 
bear no interest. Subsequent to payment in cash in 
full for a portion of the land to be conveyed, and 
upon proper notice and subsequent conveyance there-
of to respondents, appellants would have received 
full payment, in cash, and consequently no interest 
could accrue on an amount already paid in full. 
POINT VII 
THE COURT BELOW PROPERLY CONSOL-
IDATED CIVIL ACTION NO. 139263 WITH NO. 
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124832 AND P R 0 PERL Y DISMISSED NO. 
139263. 
In Civil Action No. 139263, filed with the lower 
court appellants sought a Declaratory Judgment ask-
ing the court to determine that the contracts which 
are the subject of this action, were void by reason 
of alleged breach. Appellants also asked for an in-
junction against the Rubeys to restrain them from 
proceeding with their Order to Show Cause in Civil 
Action No. 124832 from which these appeals were 
taken. This was but another attempt on the part of 
appellants to obtain a review of matters theretofore 
already conclusively adjudicated. 
If appellants objected to the Order to Show 
Cause proceedings in the case at bar, they should 
have filed their objections thereto in the instant case. 
The legal issues attempted to be raised in the declar-
atory judgment action No. 139263, if any such is-
sues existed, were barred by res judicata as a result 
of the first Supreme Court ruling in this matter (R-
9833, p. 14). In the Decree of the lower Court (R-
9833, p. 43) paragraph one states: 
"Civil Action 139263 be and the same is 
hereby consolidated with Civil Action No. 
124832, the above entitled action, and after 
such consolidation, the Motion of the plain-
tiffs herein, defendants in said action, for dis-
missal thereof, is granted in said action, Civil 
No. 139263 and the whole thereof is hereby 
dismissed.'' 
Appellants took no appeal from said Decree 
which is therefore not before this Court. Appellants 
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may not properly incorporate into this proceeding 
an appeal from action of the court in Civil No. 
139263, from which no proper appeal was taken, 
and the time for which appeal has elapsed. 
Appellants in their brief refer to a "statutory 
right to amend." Counsel for repondents are aware 
of no statutory right to amend a pleading. Perhaps 
appellants have in mind Rule 15 (a) Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, which states: "A party may amend 
his pleading once as a matter of course at any time 
before a responsive pleading is served .... " 
It is conceded in Civil No. 139263 that appel-
lants would have had a right, as a matter of course, 
to amend their Complaint at any time before a re-
sponsive pleading was served by respondents. How-
ever, respondents did enter a responsive pleading 
in the form of a Motion to Dismiss, which Motion 
was granted by the court. This foreclosed any right 
appellants may have had to amend their pleadings 
under Rule 15 (a). 
The matter of granting relief under 15 (a) 
rests largely within the sound discretion of the 
Court, to which the application is made, and its rul-
ings with respect thereto will not ordinarily be dis-
turbed unless it has been made apparent that the 
Court has abused such discretion. Johnson vs. Conti-
nental Casualty Co., 78 U. 18, 22; 300 P. 1032 
(1931). The purported issues in Civil No. 139263 
were the same as issues either already adjudicated or 
then pending in the instant case. The two cases pre-
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sent a situation squarely within the scope of Rule 
42 (a) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure providing for 
the consolidation of actions. The lower court, there-
fore, acted soundly with its discretion in consolidat-
ing Civil No. 139269 with No. 124832 and thereafter 
dismissing 139269, and no showing is made in ap-
pellants' brief that the court abused its discretion 
in that regard. Consequently the action of the lower 
court must stand. 
Furthermore, appellants in that action, to-wit: 
No. 139269 for Declaratory Judgment, made no mo-
tion for leave to amend so they cannot now be heard 
to complain that such a motion was not granted. 
Appellants further stated in their brief, "It was 
also error for the trial court to assume jurisdiction 
of a Motion to Dismiss a new case, as this matter 
should have gone before the regular Law and Motion 
Court for disposition." This statement is curious in 
that a motion signed by counsel for appellants ap-
pears in the record (R-9833, p. 366-37) as follows: 
" ... 3. That this Court direct a consoli-
dation of the action brought by the above 
named defendants and against the plaintiffs, 
and being Civil No. 139263 in the above en-
titled Court, and also the action brought by 
the plaintiffs against the defendants and 
others, case number unknown, but which case 
was filed on October 4, 1962." 
How can appellants who themselves moved to 
consolidate 139263 and 124832 now complain that 
the court granted the motion? Once the motion was 
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granted, the Motion to Dismiss filed in 139263 be-
came a part of 124832 and was properly considered 
by the court as a part of the instant case. In any 
event, no appeal was taken from the order of dis-
missal. 
Also, there is no merit to the claim that a Mo-
tion to Consolidate should have gone on the Law and 
Motion calendar when the Judge who was most 
familiar with the whole rna tter was Judge Anderson, 
who took the action complained of. 
POINT VIII 
THE L 0 WE R COURT PROPERLY DI-
RECTED THE CLERK OF THE COURT TO 
MAKE AND .DELIVER A WARRANTY DEED 
TO THE RESPONDENTS SUBSEQUENT TO 
APPELLANTS' REFUSAL TO OBEY THE OR-
DER OF THE COURT TO EXECUTE SUCH 
DEED. 
The power of the Court is set forth in the pro-
visions of Title 78-7-17, Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
which defines the powers of every judicial officer, 
including the following: 
"(2) To compel obedience to his lawful 
orders as provided by law." 
The Court is hereby granted inherent power to 
enforce its own decrees, including the ordering of 
the clerk to perform ministerial acts which the de-
fendant has refused to do when ordered to do so. See 
Love vs. Watkins, 40 Cal. 547, 6 A.R. 624 (1871), 
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cited in Bancroft, Pleading and Practice, Vol. 7, p. 
7380, note 18. In a specific performance action, if a 
party refuses to execute a deed, a commissioner may 
be appointed to execute it for him. Title 78-7-24, 
Utah Code Annotated 1953. When jurisdiction is 
by statute conferred on a court or judicial officer, 
all means necessary to declare it unto effect are also 
given, and in the exercise of jurisdiction. If the 
course of the proceeding is not specifically pointed 
out, any suitable process or mode of proceeding may 
be adopted which may appear most conformable to 
the spirit of the statute or rules of procedure. 
The judgment on directed verdict entered by 
the lower court on the 1st day of December 1960, 
ordered the appellants specifically to perform the 
contracts according to their terms. Mter this judg-
ment for specific performance was unanimously af-
firmed by the above Court appellants continued to 
repudiate the contracts and refused to perform them 
according to the Order of the Court. Following the 
Order to Show Cause proceedings, a Decree was en-
tered by the court on the 27th day of November 
1962, (R-9833, p. 43-5) wherein appellants were 
specifically ordered to execute a Warranty Deed to 
that portion of the total premises paid for by re-
spondents with their $15,000.00 payment. In the 
event of the failure of appellants to execute and de-
liver such deed, the court ordered that the clerk of 
the court should execute and deliver a deed to re-
spondents. Thereafter, appellants in fact failed and 
refused to execute the deed, and upon application 
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by respondents to the court, the clerk of the court 
was ordered to execute and did in fact execute a 
Warranty Deed and deliver the same to respondents. 
( R-9823, p. 53.) 
Rule 70, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states: 
"If a judgment directs a party to execute 
a conveyance of land or to deliver deeds or 
other documents or to perform any other spe-
cific act and the party fails to comply within 
the time specified, the Court may direct the 
act to be done at the cost of the disobedient 
party by some other person appointed by the 
Court and the act when so done has like effect 
as if done by the party. . . . " 
It would certainly be futile for the State Leg-
islature to grant authority to the Court to order spe-
cific performance of a contract without giving it the 
power to enforce its order. 
Where a judgment directs a party to execute a 
conveyance of land and the party fails, the judge 
may appoint someone else to perform the act (See 
7 Moore'IJ Fed. Practice, 2504). 
In ordering the clerk to perform the mechani-
cal act of executing a deed which appellants had 
failed to execute, although specifically ordered to do 
so, the court below did no more than exercise its 
inherent power to enforce its own Decree. 
Appellants in their brief at page 16 state the 
general rule to be that a judge is required to exercise 
his judicial authority in person without delegation 
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to another. In 16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law, Sec. 
166, p. 844 is stated: 
"Similarly there is no delegation of power 
in directing a master in chancery to make a 
conveyance in case of non-action of the party 
held by the Decree to convey, or to compute the 
amount due or determine other matters of 
fact." 
It was thus not a delegation of power by the 
lower court when it ordered the clerk to perform a 
ministerial act, i.e. execute a deed upon the failure 
and refusal of appellants to obey the court order 
to do so. 
POINT IX 
IT WAS PROPER FOR THE LOWER COURT 
TO ORDER THE CLERK OF THE COURT TO 
SATISFY A JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF PLAIN-
TIFFS-RESPONDENTS F 0 R ATTORNEY'S 
FEES AND COSTS OF SUIT OUT OF THE DE-
POSIT THAT HAD BEEN MADE TO THE 
CLERK OF THE COURT BY RESPONDENTS. 
Appellants make no comment in their brief re-
lating to their Point No. 9. No facts are referred 
to and no authorities are cited on that point. Point 
9 therefore should be disregarded by the Court. See 
Point XI below. 
By stipulation dated December 7, 1962, (R-
9833, p. 46) appellants stipulated that "no objec-
tion will be made to the obtaining by plaintiffs by 
and through their attorneys of record of the sum 
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of $1,764.00 from the clerk of the above entitled 
Court pursuant to the said Decree entered Novem-
ber 28, 1962," which was in full force and effect 
on the day that said funds were obtained from the 
clerk. Therefore, by reason of said Stipulation, ap-
pellants' Point No. 9 is not well taken and is im-
proper. 
Even if the Stipulation referred to above were 
not in the record, the court would nevertheless have 
had the power to order the clerk of the court to en-
force the judgment of the court for attorneys' fees 
and costs in that such order is merely an exercise of 
the inherent power of the court to enforce its de-
crees and judgments (See Point VIII above). 
The typewritten contract dated April 18, 1959 
states as follows: 
" ... In the event either party violates 
any terms herein, the offended party shall 
have recourse to an attroney (sic), the costs 
of which shall be borne by the violating par-
ty." 
Subsequent to the first appeal, on the 12th day 
of September 1962, the court entered an additonal 
judgment in favor of respondents and against ap-
pellants for attorney's fees in the amount of $500.00 
in connection with the first appeal in this matter 
arising out of appellants' refusal to perform the con-
tract as ordered by the court. No appeal was taken 
from the judgment for attorney's fees, and appel-
lants thereby waived their objection that the court 
could not properly award attorney's fees during the 
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course of the proceedings and before a final deter-
mination of this appeal. 
Based on said judgment, the clerk of the court 
issued a garnishment against Alvin Keddington, 
County Clerk, garnishee, to attach a $15,000.00 fund 
held by the Court and deposited by respondents in 
Civil Action No. 139046. The garnishment was duly 
served and duly executed upon out of the funds held 
by the clerk. All of these procedures were clearly 
proper and within the powers of the court and clerk 
pursuant to law. The awarding of judgment for at-
torney's fees cannot be said to have deprived appel-
lants of due process of law for they were awarded 
more than their day in court on the issue of the 
validity and enforceability of the contracts, includ-
ing provision for attorney's fees. S_uch action by the 
court cannot be said to have prejudiced the rights 
of mortagees who obtained mortgages from appel-
lants subsequent to the original Decree of the court 
ordering specific performance. These mortgages had 
no claim to the funds held on deposit by the clerk of 
the court, and consequently any dispositon of said 
funds by garnishment or cou,rt order could not in 
any way affect the rights of said mortgagees. 
POINT X 
THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY A WARD-
ED JUDGMENT FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES IN 
FAVOR OF RESPONDENTS BASED UPON THE 
TESTIMONY OF COUNSEL FOR RESPOND-
ENTS. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
43 
The language contained in the typewritten con-
tract quoted above with respect to attorney's fees, 
makes no reference to the reasonableness thereof and 
the lower court properly determined that the only 
evidence to support an award of attorney's fees 
which would be required by the court was evidence 
of the charge made by respondents' counsel. Testi-
mony was taken under oath before the court from 
counsel for respondents as to the amount charged 
for attorney's fees, which testimony was uncontro-
verted. 
To disallow attorney's fees because . the word 
attorney is misspelled in the typewritten contract is 
too ridiculous to deserve comment. 
POINT XI 
THE APPELLATE COURT SHOULD NOT 
GIVE CONSIDERATION TO APPELLANTS' 
BRIEF FOR THE REASON THAT IT STATES 
ONLY POINTS OF LAW AND MAKES NO REF-
ERENCE TO ANY FACTS IN THE RECORD TO 
WHICH SUCH POINTS OF LAW MAY BE REL-
EVANT. 
Throughout appellants' brief, random refer-
ences to various authorities are made without ref-
erence to any facts in the record. By failing to relate 
the facts from the record to points of law quoted, 
appellants have waived any claim of error on the 
part of the lower court. In Felkner vs. Smith, 77 
U. 410, 296 P. 776 ( 1931) at p. 48, an action founded 
upon a ·negotiable promissory note wherein the de-
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fendant appealed from the judgment of the trial 
court in favor of plaintiff for the amount due upon 
the note, this Court stated that an assignment of 
error was not argued in appellants' brief and there-
fore it was deemed waived. Similarly, appellants 
herein have waived any claim of error they might 
have argued, had they done so sufficiently. 
Further, in an action to recover from an insur-
ance company when the roof of a house collapsed, 
the Court in North British and Mercantile Ins. Co. 
vs. Sciandra, 256 Ala. 409, 54 So. 2d 764 (1951) 
said that an appellate court may deny consideration 
to assignments of error which are not referred to in 
the brief, or, while mentioned in the brief, are not 
supported by citations of authority or argued suf-
ficiently. Appellants have mentioned various alleged 
errors in their brief but have failed to argue their 
points sufficently. Appellants' brief herein can be 
said to be no more than a statement of points with 
random citations of law. None of the matters re-
ferred to in appellants' brief are sufficiently argued 
or sufficiently related to any facts in the record so 
that the above Court can intelligently make an ap-
praisal of any alleged error supposedly committed 
by the lower court. For these reasons, appellants' 
brief should be disregarded and the action of the 
lower court should be affirmed. 
POINT XII 
APPEAL NO. 10001 SHOULD BE DIS-
MISSED BECAUSE THE ORDER ENTERED 
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SEPTEMBER 26, 1963 FROM WHICH THE AP-
PEAL IS TAKEN IS NOT A FINAL JUDGMENT. 
Rule 72 (a) U.R.C.P. states: "An appeal may 
be taken to the Supreme Court from all final judg-
ments, in accordance with these rules ... " (See 
Utah Constitution, Art. 8, Sec. 9.) 
A judgment, to be final, must dispose of the 
case as to all of the parties and finally dispose of the 
subject matter of the litigation on the merits of the 
case. Shurtz vs. Thorley, 90 U. 381, 384, 61 P. 2d 
1262 (1936). 
The order entered below on September 26, 
1963 (R-10001, p. 166), is erroneous. It states: 
"Defendants' Motion to overrule objec-
tions to the amendment of the decree comes 
regularly before the Court for hearing. The 
plaintiffs appearing by R. Wm. Bradford as 
counsel. The defendants appearing and being 
represented by Wm. J. Cayais as counsel. Said 
motion is then argued to the Court by respec-
tive counsel and submitted. Whereupon the 
Court having considered and being advised 
hereby denies said motion.'' 
In fact it was plaintiffs' motion which was be-
for the court. (R-10001, p. 165), by which plain-
tiffs-respondents moved to overrule the Objections 
of defendants (R-10001, p. 161) to the Amendment 
to Decree (R-10001, p. 155). The order of September 
26, 1963, should have stated: 
"Plaintiffs' Motion to overrule objections 
to the amendment of the decree comes regular-
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ly before the court for hearing, the plaintiff 
appearing by R. Wm. Bradford, Jr. as coun-
sel, the defendants appearing and being repre-
sented by Wm. J. Cayias as counsel. Said 
motion is then argued to the court by respec-
tive counsel and submitted. Whereupon the 
court having considered and being advised 
hereby grants said motion." 
That the above statement is correct with re-
spect to the action taken by the court September 
26, 1963, is supported by the fact that there appears 
nothing in the record correcting or otherwise dis-
turbing the Amendment to Decree, which would have 
been corrected or otherwise changed had defendants-
appellants' objections thereto been allowed, rather 
than overruled. 
In any event, action by the court with respect 
to Objections to Amendment to Decree or a Motion 
to Overrule such objections, is not such a final dis-
position of the subject matter of the case on the 
merits as would constitute an appealable "final judg-
ment." Similarly the denial of a Motion for a New 
Trial is not an appealable "final judgment." Price 
vs. Western Loan and Savings Co., 35 U. 379, 100 P. 
677 (1909); Nunley v. Katz, ________ U. 2d ________ , 388 
P. 2d 798 (1964); Haslam v. Paulsen ______ U. 2d ______ , 
389 P. 2d 736 (1964). 
Appellants in their brief appear to assume that 
they have appealed from the entry of the only ap-
pealable final judgment which appears in the rec-
ord subsequent to the first appeal, i.e. the July 29, 
1963 Amendment to Decree. (R-10001, p. 155), but 
this they have not done, as will be shown hereinafter. 
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It is true that appellants' Notice of Appeal (R-10001, 
p. 167) refers to "all orders and decisions rendered 
by the above-entitled Court with respect to all pro-
ceedings that have been had since the above-entitled 
matter was reconsidered after return from the Su-
preme Court." Also, the Notice further states: "This 
appeal is on every decision and order rendered here-
in as well as the report of the referee which was 
adopted after objections by the above entitled 
Court." 
Such sweeping language is certainly contrary 
to the intent of Rule 73 (b) U.R.C.P., which requires 
specific designation of the judgment appealed from. 
Price vs. Western Loan and Savings Co.; Nunley 
vs. Katz, supra. It is submitted that by failing to 
specify the July 29, 1963 Amendment to Decree in 
their Notice of Appeal appellants have failed to ap-
peal therefrom. 
A litigant is not entitled to review, on appeal, 
of that from which he has not appealed. In Nunley 
vs. Katz, supra, this Court dismissed an appeal on 
the grounds that appellants there were not en-
titled to review of a judgment entered December 3, 
1962, where the Notice of Appeal specified a judg-
ment entered January 3, 1963. The Court there 
stated: "Respondent is entitled to know specifically 
which judgment is being appealed." Appellants there 
contended that the reference in the Notice to the 
wrong judgment was a clerical error which should 
have been corrected by the Court under Rule 60 (a) 
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U.R.C.P. The Court denied this contention and dis-
missed the appeal. 
Appellants in the case at bar have not appealed 
from the July 29, 1963, Amendment to Decree, but 
only from the September 26, 1963, minute order 
which was not a final judgment which this court 
may consider on appeal. 
In Price vs. Western Loan and Saving'S Co., 
supra, appellant designated in the Notice of Appeal, 
not the final judgment entered September 26, 1960, 
but an order denying a Motion for New Trial en-
tered December 8, 1960. The court held that appeal 
did not lie. Likewise Appeal No. 10001, does not lie, 
for similar reasons. 
The fact that the time within which appellants 
may file a Notice of Appeal under Rule 73 (b) 
U.R.C.P. begins to run from the denial of a Motion 
for a New Trial under Rule 59, or the overruling of 
Objections to findings under Rule 52, does not allow 
appellants to specify, in a Notice of Appeal filed 
within said time, an order from which no appeal can 
be taken, instead of the final judgment. Appellants 
in No. 10001 filed their Notice of Appeal (R-10001, 
p. 167) within ten days after the Minute Order 
of September 26, 1963, (R-10001, p. 166) but having 
failed to appeal specifically from the Decree of July 
29, 1963, (R-10001, p. 155) their appeal should be 
denied for the reasons, and based upon the authority 
hereinabove set forth. 
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CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that upon the fore-
going presentation of authorities and argument that 
the action of the lower Court from which these ap-
peals were taken was proper and that the said action 
should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PERRIS S. JENSEN 
R. WILLIAM BRADFORD, JR. 
Attorneys for Rrupondents 
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